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Though trade secrets began as creatures of the common law, they 
first achieved widespread acceptance as valuable intellectual property 
after their incorporation into the Restatement of Torts.1 Forty years 
later, The Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) slightly modified the 
Restatement’s definition.2 Nearly every state has now adopted its own 
trade secrets act that is substantively similar to the UTSA.3 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted to serve 
policies essentially antithetical to those of trade secrets—allowing 
individuals to access records collected by governmental agencies.4 
While the FOIA contains a provision exempting trade secrets from 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.S. in Physics and B.S. in Astronomy, University of Illinois 
Champaign-Urbana, 2004. 
1 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
2 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979). The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the UTSA at the request of the 
American Bar Association. 
3 See 2 MELVIN JAGER , TRADE SECRETS LAW § 12.1 (2007). 
4 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
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public FOIA requests,5 invocation of the exemption discretionary on 
the part of the agency. The purported trade secret owner has no power 
to influence the agency’s decision.6 Consequently, competitors in 
business occasionally are able to obtain information through a FOIA 
request considered to be trade secrets by their owners. This type of 
situation raises a legal question about whether a trade secret can 
continue to exist after its disclosure by the government. 
Patriot Homes, Inc. and Forest River Housing, Inc. are 
competitors in the modular housing industry.7 In Patriot Homes, Inc. v. 
Forest River Housing, Inc.,8 the defendant admitted that the plaintiff’s 
former employees took information from the plaintiff after being hired 
by the defendant, but argued that any misbegotten information was no 
longer a trade secret after showing it to be ascertainable through FOIA 
requests. While the Seventh Circuit rightfully vacated an 
impermissibly vague preliminary injunction issued by the lower 
court,9 the parties continue to disagree about whether a trade secret can 
exist where nearly all of the allegedly secret information is available 
through FOIA requests to state agencies.  
The first section of this paper will discuss the facts, procedural 
posture, and issues raised by Patriot Homes. This will provide an 
important framework through which to view the subsequent analysis 
of the two seemingly disparate legal regimes implicated by the case—
trade secret law and the Freedom of Information Act. 
The second section will analyze the various statutory schemes 
under which trade secrets have been accorded legal protection. The 
most well-established common law trade secret definition derives from 
the 1939 Restatement of Torts. That definition was eventually 
                                                 
5 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). 
6 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979). 
7 Modular homes are houses that are divided into multiple modules, or sections, 
which are manufactured in a remote facility and then delivered to their intended site 
of use. The modules are assembled into a single residential building using either a 
crane or trucks. Typically, modular dwellings are built to local state or council code, 
so dwellings built in a given manufacturing facility will have differing construction 
standards depending on the final destination of the modules. 
8 Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2008). 
9 Id. at 416. 
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supplemented by interpretations in both the Uniform Trade Secret Act 
(UTSA) and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. All of the 
states within the Seventh Circuit have adopted the UTSA, though each 
state’s trade secret law contains its own subtle differences. 
The third section considers the Freedom of Information Act’s 
seemingly conflicting goals—providing transparency to governmental 
records and ensuring that private entities are not harmed by entrusting 
their records with the government. This paper offers analysis of the 
FOIA’s Exemption 4, designed to protect trade secrets and confidential 
information from disclosure to the public. Finally, this section 
discusses the individual state FOIA statutes within the Seventh Circuit 
and their trade secret exemptions, which provide good examples for 
the range of methods that states have chosen to address the contrasting 
areas of law. 
Finally, the last section of this paper will discuss some policy 
considerations related to several foreseeable legal conflicts arising 
from FOIA’s policy of maximum disclosure of agency records. 
Included is an analysis of the likely outcome of Patriot Homes’ trade 
secret issue and proposals that would afford those submitting 
information to government agencies greater control over their privacy 
without substantially diminishing the public’s access to government 
records. 
 
I.  PATRIOT HOMES, INC. V. FOREST RIVER HOUSING, INC. 
 
In 2004, Forest River Housing attempted to purchase Patriot 
Homes, a Midwest company that builds modular homes.10 
Unsuccessful in its attempt to purchase the company, Forest River 
hired away four of Patriot’s management level employees, formed a 
new company called Sterling Homes, and entered the modular housing 
industry.11 Prior to leaving Patriot, the four departing employees 
                                                 
10 Id. at 413. 
11 Id. Prior to entering the modular housing industry, Forest River primarily 
focused on selling recreational vehicles. Forest River, Inc. company profile, 
http://www.forestriverinc.com/nd/default22.asp?nav=housing&page=aboutus (last 
visited May 1, 2008). 
3
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copied information from Patriot’s computers and brought those 
materials with them to Sterling.12 
According to Patriot, Sterling then used the purloined information 
to build and sell homes that were identical to those sold by Patriot.13 
Therefore, in its suit against Sterling, Patriot claimed, inter alia, that 
Sterling had misappropriated its trade secrets.14 Patriot therefore 
sought injunctions against, and damages from, Sterling and Patriot’s 
four former employees.15 
Like manufacturers in many industries, modular home 
manufacturers must obtain approval from the states in which they 
desire to sell their homes.16 In order to obtain that approval, companies 
must submit a wide variety of technical data to the appropriate state 
agencies. As such, in order to sell its products in Indiana, Patriot 
submitted to state agencies a great deal of the information in which it 
later claimed trade secret protection.17 
While the foregoing facts follow a pattern very common to many 
trade secret cases, Patriot Homes is somewhat unique due to the 
character of Sterling’s defense to the trade secret misappropriation 
claim. Sterling did not deny that Patriot’s former employees took 
useful information from Patriot’s computers before leaving the 
company.18 Nor did Sterling deny that it used that information.19 
Instead, Sterling argued that all of Patriot’s alleged trade secrets and 
confidential information were readily ascertainable and in the public 
domain so that Sterling’s use of the information did not constitute 
trade secret misappropriation.20 In supporting this defense, Sterling 
provided thousands of pages of documents, submitted by Patriot to 
various state agencies, which Sterling obtained through FOIA requests 
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after Patriot initiated the litigation.21 Those documents contained the 
vast majority of the information that Patriot had claimed as its trade 
secrets.22 
After the district court for the Northern District of Indiana issued 
a preliminary injunction against Sterling, Sterling submitted FOIA 
requests to various state agencies, in Indiana and elsewhere, requesting 
copies of all the documents that Patriot submitted in order to obtain 
approval to sell its homes in those states.23 In response to Sterling’s 
request, government agencies in Indiana, along with agencies in all of 
the other states that received requests from Sterling, produced 
thousands of documents, comprising the bulk Patriot’s purported trade 
secrets and confidential information.24 Though Patriot wrote each state 
requesting that they take remedial action to preserve the confidential 
nature of the information, none of the state agencies indicated that it 
would comply or that the documents were improperly produced.25 
Patriot contended that the information it submitted to the various 
state agencies still constituted proprietary trade secrets.26 Sterling, on 
the other hand, continued to assert that Patriot could claim trade secret 
protection only for information that was not readily ascertainable.27 In 
light of the results from its FOIA request, Sterling argued that the vast 
majority of Patriot’s asserted trade secrets could no longer receive 
statutory protection from the Indiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(IUTSA) because it was readily available.28 
Procedurally, Patriot Homes reached the Seventh Circuit on 
interlocutory appeal to review whether Patriot’s preliminary injunction 
was too vague for a court to ensure proper enforcement.29 The 
injunction enjoined Sterling from “using, copying, disclosing, 
converting, appropriating . . . or otherwise exploiting Patriot’s 
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copyrights, confidential information, trade secrets, or computer 
files.”30 It also required Sterling to “certify that copied data and 
materials of Patriot’s property, confidential information and trade 
secrets on computer files and removable media . . . have been deleted 
or rendered unusable.”31 
While Sterling did not take issue with the injunction’s prohibition 
on using the computer files taken from Patriot’s computer, it asserted 
that the remainder of the injunction was too vague because it did not 
define Patriot’s “confidential information and trade secrets,” and 
thereby failed to give Sterling notice as to which actions would violate 
the injunction.32 
As will be discussed in greater detail in the proceeding section, 
the IUTSA prohibits using another’s trade secrets but also requires that 
information not be publicly known or readily ascertainable in order to 
be protectable as a trade secret.33 In light of the results of Sterling’s 
FOIA requests, the appellate court held that Patriot’s injunction did not 
clarify what the confidential information or trade secrets were.34 The 
district court essentially needed to determine whether the results of 
Sterling’s FOIA requests were still protectable trade secrets or had 
become public information.35 “Sterling cannot tell, and neither can we, 
whether using the information it obtained through the FOIA requests 
would violate the injunction.”36 The Seventh Circuit previously held, 
as have many other circuits, that the protectable substance of a trade 
secret must be defined in order to determine the proper scope of an 
injunction.37 If it is not, the injunction will not be detailed or specific 




33 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, §§ 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985). 
34 Patriot Homes, 512 F.3d at 415-16. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 415. 
37 See Am. Can v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 326 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
the district court erred by failing to consider what information about plaintiff’s 
formulas were public knowledge in determining the scope of a preliminary 
injunction); see also E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1115-17 
(8th Cir.1969) (trade secret injunction too vague); cf. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. 
6
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 696
enough to ensure proper enforcement, through contempt proceedings 
or otherwise.38 
It can be difficult at the preliminary stages of a case to determine 
what information actually constitutes a trade secret or confidential 
information. Ultimately, though, a district court still must make that 
determination in order to put a defendant on notice regarding its 
responsibilities pursuant to a preliminary injunction.39 The Seventh 
Circuit, therefore, vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction 
and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion.40 
During the time that Sterling’s interlocutory appeal was pending, 
the Northern District of Indiana heard Sterling’s motion for partial 
summary judgment on Patriot’s trade secret claims.41 Sterling based its 
motion on its defense that Patriot’s asserted trade secrets were readily 
ascertainable by proper means.42 The district court was unreceptive to 
Sterling’s arguments and denied its motion for three reasons. First, not 
all of Patriots asserted trade secrets were contained in Sterling’s FOIA 
responses.43 Second, because “it is ‘no defense to claim that one’s 
product could have been developed independently . . . if, in fact it was 
developed using plaintiff’s proprietary designs.’”44 Finally, the court 
noted that the data stolen by Patriot’s former employees held value 
independent of the hard copies obtained through FOIA requests, based 
                                                                                                                   
Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 684 (7th Cir.1983) (upholding a preliminary injunction that 
gave notice of the restrained acts and provided a procedure for interpreting and 
applying the injunction and distinguishing between plaintiff's trade secrets and 
information in the public domain). 
38 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 
injunctions “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or 
other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Id. 
39 Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., 512 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2008). 
40 Id. at 416. 
41 Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., No. 3:05 CV 471 AS, 2007 
WL 2782272 at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2007) 
42 Id. at *2. 
43 Id. 
44Id. at *3 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. 1993)) 
(emphasis added). 
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solely on its medium, because the electronic format lends itself to 
more efficient engineering and copying than does the paper format.45 
While the court ultimately was not receptive to the specific 
defense raised by the defendant, Patriot Homes highlights the inherent 
potential for conflict between trade secret law and FOIA laws. The 
district court’s denial of Sterling’s motion does not obviate need for 
companies like Patriot Homes to be able to protect their trade secrets. 
Patriot initiated its litigation against Sterling because Patriot’s former 
employees stole confidential information. Sterling’s subsequent 
housing designs too closely resembled Patriot’s designs not to raise 
suspicions. Had Sterling originally taken the FOIA route to obtaining 
Patriot’s information, Patriot likely would have had no legal recourse 
to stop its competitor from using its designs.46 
Oftentimes, companies are statutorily compelled to disclose 
information to government agencies whose secrecy is intrinsic to its 
value.47 However, due to federal and state FOIA laws, which recognize 
the societal benefits of transparent governance, companies can, 
without recourse, lose valuable proprietary information to their 
competitors.48 Patriot Homes is merely one example of the possible 
ramifications of the conflict between trade secret law and freedom of 
information laws. 
Just as the Northern District of Indiana, on remand, must now 
negotiate the seemingly asymptotic relationship between the two areas 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 In that situation, Patriot might still have a viable copyright infringement 
claim relating to its architectural plans, which were also included in Patriot’s initial 
complaint but have yet to be decided. Such copyright claims generally cover only the 
design elements of plans, however, and not the functional or statutorily required 
elements. For more on the copyrightability of architectural works, see generally 
WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, ch. 3, §§ 102-116 (2007). 
47 In Patriot Homes’ case, the disclosures were necessary in order to sell their 
homes in Indiana. Patriot Homes, 512 F.3d at 414. Other circumstances where a 
company might be forced to disclose proprietary information to government 
agencies include, for example, bids to win government contracts, FDA or EPA 
reporting requirements, and financial reporting requirements such as those in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-204 (2002). 
48 See Stephen R. Wilson, Public Disclosure Policies: Can A Company Still 
Protect Its Trade Secrets?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 280-283 (2003-2004). 
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of law, so too shall this paper analyze the two bodies of law. In order 
to illuminate the conflict, this paper will first discuss trade secret law 
in general and then analyze trade secrets’ treatment by freedom of 
information laws. 
 
II.  TRADE SECRETS 
 
The formal protection of confidential business information dates 
back to Roman law.49 Both early English cases and early American 
cases tended to treat the subject as a breach of confidence rather than 
one that involved property rights.50 In contrast, treating trade secrets as 
property is a crucial facet of most modern caselaw on the subject.51 
This remains true even in cases that turn on a defendant’s actions—








                                                 
49 A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930). 
50 See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (emphasizing that confidential 
disclosures do not destroy a trade secret’s requisite secrecy), Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 
N.E. 12 (N.Y. 1889) (recognizing competitors’ right to acquire information through 
reverse engineering); Morison v. Moat, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch.) (enforcing a 
contract between the parties that treated “Morrison’s Secret Formula” as a trade 
secret); Newberry v. James, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.) (denying an injunction 
because the court was unable to protect a secret not disclosed in court). 
51 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding trade 
secrets to be property protected under the Fifth Amendment). In Monsanto, the 
plaintiff sought compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause for the 
EPA’s disclosure, through a response to a FOIA request, of Monsanto’s highly 
valuable trade secrets concerning a pesticide that Monsanto developed. Id. 
52 See, e.g. Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(reversing lower court’s finding that defendant misappropriated plaintiff’s trade 
secret after finding that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of confidence). 
9
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A.  The Restatements and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
 
1.  The Restatement of Torts 
 
The early trade secret decisions demonstrated that a practical 
definition of a “trade secret” was developing slowly and haphazardly 
in the common law. Trade secret law lingered in a somewhat uncertain 
state when the Restatement of Torts was published in 1939.53 The 
Restatement’s treatment of trade secrets became the focus of courts’ 
attention and helped coalesce trade secret concepts in the common 
law.54 
The Restatement defined trade secrets as follows: 
 
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device 
or compilation of information which is used in one’s 
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know how to use it. 
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of 
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern 
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.55 
 
The Restatement also qualifies that trade secrets are not single or 
temporal pieces of information.56 Rather, “a trade secret is a process . . 
. for continuous use in the operation of the business.”57 Courts 
subsequently held that a bevy of nontechnical subject matter can 
                                                 
53 2 MELVIN JAGER , TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3.1 (2007). 
54 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974) (adopting the 
Restatement definition of trade secrets). 
55 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). 
56 Id.; see also Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 297-98 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (citing the Restatement in finding that a trade secret “is not simply 
information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business” such as 
“the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain 
employees.”). 
57 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). 
10
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qualify as trade secrets, including business pricing information,58 sales 
data,59 supplier capabilities,60 marketing plans,61 promotional 
materials,62 and even some religious texts.63 Though generally 
afforded weak protection, courts almost unanimously hold that 
customer lists can also qualify as trade secrets.64 
Abstract ideas, though not completely precluded from trade secret 
protection, often face challenges because it can be difficult for a 
plaintiff to claim that they possess economic value.65 A lack of 
definitiveness may preclude proof of secrecy,66 a determination of 
whether the purported secret has been appropriated, or an appropriate 
formula for relief.67 
                                                 
58 See SI Handling Sys, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1260 (3d Cir. 1985); 
but see Fortna v. Martin, 323 P.2d 146 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that 
methods of pricing were not protectable because they were not confidential and 
therefore not secret). 
59 Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 415 (Mass. 1991). 
60 Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1986). 
61 Imi-Tech Corp. v. Gagliani, 691 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
62 Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972). 
63 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that if scriptural materials pertaining to the Church of Scientology had 
economic value, they too may qualify as trade secrets). 
64 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(granting trade secret protection to sales lists, field operation manuals, and computer 
software); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(mailing lists); Zoecon Indus. v. Am. Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 
1983) (customer lists); Allen v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark. 45 (1992) (customer lists do not 
need to be written down to be trade secrets); but see Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 
F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1978) (denying protection to a “mere list of customers”);  
65 See Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1976). 
66 See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993). 
67 See AMP, Inc.v . Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(plaintiff failed to specify the exact nature of the asserted trade secret, relying instead 
on a long list of areas of general information containing unidentified trade secrets). 
AMP was superseded by the Illinois Trade Secrets Act although the law remains 
substantively the same. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 
1995). 
11
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Of course, the single most important requirement for a trade secret 
is that it must actually be secret.68 Without actual secrecy, none of the 
other elements of trade secret law are relevant. Matters of public or 
general knowledge in a particular industry cannot comprise trade 
secrets.69 Likewise, matters that are publicly disclosed through 
marketing and sales of goods are not trade secrets, so sales reports and 
pricing information that might otherwise qualify as trade secrets would 
not be entitled to protection if that information is readily available to 
customers or routinely quoted over the telephone.70 
Additionally, in order for a trade secret to be “used in one’s 
business,” a trade secret owner must be able to communicate it to his 
or her employees – total secrecy is not required.71 The Restatement 
generalizes that “a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, 
except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in 
acquiring the information.”72 
While some courts found it difficult to devise an exact definition 
of a trade secret,73 the Restatement offered six often-cited factors for 
consideration in determining whether to accord one’s information the 
status of “trade secret.” Those factors are:  
 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of 
[the trade secret owner’s] business; (2) the extent to which 
it is known by employees and others involved in [the trade 
                                                 
68 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). This, in essence, defines 
Sterling’s defense that, regardless of its actions, it could not have misappropriated 
Patriot’s trade secrets because all of the asserted trade secrets were comprised of 
information publicly available through FOIA requests. Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest 
River Hous., Inc., No. 3:05 CV 471 AS, 2007 WL 2782272 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 
2007). 
69 Master Records, Inc. v. Backman, 652 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1982) (en banc). 
70 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939); see also Smith Oil Corp. v. 
Viking Chem. Co., 468 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
71 Id. 
72 Id.; see also Cent. Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537 P.2d 330 (Okla. 1975). 
73 Cont’l Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1986) 
(“the law provides no precise definition or litmus test of what constitutes a trade 
secret”); see Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 245 N.E.2d 263, 278-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969). 
12
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secret owner’s] business; (3) the extent of measures taken 
by [the trade secret owner] to guard the secrecy of the 
information; (4) the value of the information to [the trade 
secret owner] and to his competitors; (5) the amount of 
effort or money expended by [the trade secret owner] in 
developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with 
which the information could be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others.74 
 
The Supreme Court solidified the Restatement definition’s 
standing in the common law when it cited to it in Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp.75 The Kewanee court summarized the policy rationales 
for trade secret protection as the “maintenance of standards of 
commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention,”76 the efficient 
exploitation of information by encouraging the dissemination of ideas 
through confidentiality agreements,77 and protecting the right to 
privacy that is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or 
made profitable.78 
 
2.  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
 
Although the Restatement’s treatment of trade secrets gained wide 
acceptance, the subject of trade secrets was omitted from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Reacting to that, and a need to address 
several important aspects of trade secret law that the 1939 Restatement 
did not cover, such as injunctive relief and the statute of limitations, in 
                                                 
74 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939); see also Integrated Cash 
Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1990); 
SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley 753 F.2d 1244, 1256 (3d Cir. 1985); Wilson v. 
Electro Marine Sys., Inc., 915 F.2d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1990) (New York law 
applied). Additionally, no single factor is sufficient to establish a trade secret. 
Chanay v. Chittenden, 563 P.2d 287, 294 (Ariz. 1977); Nat’l Rejectors, Inc. v. 
Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 19-20 (Mo. 1966). 
75 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
76 Id. at 481. 
77 Id. at 486-87. 
78 Id. at 487. 
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1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws approved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).79 
The UTSA’s definition of “trade secrets” departs from that of the 
Restatement by omitting the requirement that a secret be used 
“continuously” by a business and is broad enough to include so-called 
“negative” information.80 According to the Act, “trade secret” means: 
 
Information, including a formula pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) 
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is 
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.81 
 
This definition essentially sets out four requirements that a 
purported trade secret must meet to fulfill the UTSA’s definition.82 In 
modified form, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has thus far been 
adopted in forty-six states.83 Among those states are all three that 
comprise the Seventh Circuit.84 
 
 
                                                 
79 For an extensive commentary on the need for a uniform act and its adoption, 
see Ramon A. Klitze, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277 (1980). 
80 Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202-03 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
81 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985). 
82 From this definition, the UTSA requires that a trade secret be (1) 
information; (2) that derives independent economic value; (3) from not being 
generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means by others who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (4) is the subject of reasonable 
efforts, under the circumstances, to maintain its secrecy. Id. 
83 For an extensive list of citations to all forty-seven state trade secret acts, see 
JAGER, supra note 3, § 12.1.  
84 Among other differences, Illinois reworded its remedies provisions 
eliminating a perceived loophole in the UTSA and making it easier for plaintiffs to 
receive injunctive relief. Id. at § 31.2. 
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 704
3.  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
 
The American Law Institute instead revised its treatment of trade 
secrets, harmonizing it with the UTSA, and incorporated trade secrets 
into the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.85 The new 
treatment omitted the six factors, opting instead for a more holistic 
approach to relevant factors such as the monetary value of the 
purported trade secret, the secrecy and definiteness of the information, 
and the nature of the defendant’s (mis)conduct in obtaining the 
information.86 While the Restatement of Torts continues to be cited in 
many trade secret cases,87 some courts have begun to recognize and 
endorse the more recent iteration.88 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a trade 
secret as “any information that can be used in the operation of a 
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret 
to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”89 
Notably, however, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition’s 
treatment of trade secrets “is directly applicable only to the imposition 
of civil liability” and “does not apply . . . in other circumstances not 
involving civil liability for the appropriation of a trade secret, such as 
the protection of trade secrets from disclosure under the Freedom of 
                                                 
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION, ch. 4 §§ 38-45 (1995); see 
Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 297 n.16 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting 
that trade secrets were more appropriately incorporated into the Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition). 
86 In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the Restatement 
of Torts’ six factors are unnecessary in light of the UTSA and Restatement (Third) 
of Unfair Competition). 
87 See Stenstrom Petroleum Servs. Group, Inc. v. Mesch, 874 N.E.2d 959, 972 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (using the Restatement of Torts to inform the court’s 
interpretation of Illinois trade secret law); Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 
N.W.2d 773, 777-78 (Wis. 1989) (noting that while Wisconsin law no longer follows 
the Restatement of Torts’ definition of trade secret, it still is a helpful resource in 
interpreting trade secret laws). 
88 In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 740. 
89 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
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Information Act.”90 This paper’s analysis of the newer Restatement 
will thus be similarly limited. 
Although, by its own terms, the Restatement is not directly 
applicable to FOIA trade secret issues, the Restatement contains some 
relevant discussion. The subject matter of a trade secret is defined as 
“a formula . . . device, method, technique, process, or other form or 
embodiment of economically valuable information . . . [and] can relate 
to technical matters . . . necessary to perform a particular operation or 
service.”91 The final clause, implicating a relationship between the 
trade secret and the performance of an operation or service is similar 
to the language used by a number of courts in conceptualizing the 
definition of trade secrets for the purposes of the FOIA exemptions.92 
Unlike the Restatement of Torts, the newer Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition does not require that trade secrets be capable of 
continuous use or maintain their value for any duration.93 Trade secrets 
can relate to single events such as secret bids and impending business 
announcements, whose value derives from its secrecy and whose 
secrecy is temporary.94 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair competition largely adopted 
other elements of trade secrets, as they were defined in the 
Restatement of Torts. Trade Secrets still pertain to just about any 
information that can offer a competitive advantage based on its 
secrecy.95 And trade secret information still must not be readily 
obtainable.96 While a trade secret must have competitive value, time 
                                                 
90 Id. § 39, cmt. b. 
91 Id. § 39, cmt. d. 
92 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
93 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39, cmt. d. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.; see Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 628 (5th Cir. 1994) (a trade secret 
“must give the owner a competitive advantage”); see generally e.g. Kewanee Oil Co. 
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974) (a trade secret need not be patentable); but 
see Nickelson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 361 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1966) (a “trivial” 
advance might not be protectable). 
96 See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird., 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993) (acquisition 
by proper means need not be economically infeasible “a substantial investment of 
16
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and money spent developing the secret, precautions to maintain its 
secrecy, and a third party’s willingness to pay for access through 
licensing agreements all serve as evidence of the information’s value.97 
The same factors can also be useful as evidence of relative secrecy,98 
and can signal to employees and others that information is 
confidential.99 If, however, a misappropriation was not the result of 
security lapses, “those lapses should not be the basis for denying 
protection.”100 
 
B.  Representative State Trade Secret Statutes 
 
The three states that comprise the Seventh Circuit represent a fair 
sampling for the various ways that states across the country have 
chosen to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For example, Indiana’s 
legislature enacted the UTSA shortly after its adoption and with 
minimal changes.101 Wisconsin adopted most of the UTSA’s 
provisions but continues to use the Restatement of Torts’ definition of 
“trade secrets.”102 Illinois, on the other hand, changed several UTSA 
provisions prior to enacting its own version of the law.103 
                                                                                                                   
time, expense, or effort” will suffice); see also T.P. Labs., Inc. v. Huge, 261 F. Supp. 
349, 358-59 (E.D. Wisc. 1965), aff’d 371 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1966) (“Information is 
readily available if it is available in trade journals, reference books, or published 
materials”). 
97 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus, Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 
1991) (precautions taken to protect secrecy can indicate value); Tan-Line Studios, 
Inc. v. Bradley, No. 84-5925, 1986 WL 3764, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1986) 
(willingness of licensees to pay for access to secret and defendant’s decision to resort 
to improper means are evidence value). 
98 See Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 
1986); cf. Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806 (Ill. 1921) (precautions are not 
enough if evidence reveals that the information is generally known). 
99 See, e.g. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987). 
100 Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 1982 WL 63797, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1982), 
aff’d 701 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983). 
101 See JAGER, supra note 3, § 32:1 (Trade Secrets Law of Indiana). 
102 See id. at § 67:1 (Trade Secrets Law of Wisconsin). 
103 See id. at § 31:2 (Explaining several differences between the UTSA and the 
Illinois trade Secret Act). Despite their differences, however, the three states’ 
17
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Under the Indiana Act, a trade secret is (1) information; (2) 
deriving independent economic value; (3) that is not generally known 
or readily ascertainable by proper means by others who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (4) is the subject of 
efforts, reasonable under the circumstances, to maintain its secrecy.104 
Like Patriot Homes, the majority of recent trade secrets cases in 
Indiana have turned on whether a purported trade secret is publicly 
available or readily ascertainable, and the resources required to 
independently discover it.105 
Unlike Indiana, Wisconsin chose to keep its definition of trade 
secrets in line with the common law rather than based on the UTSA 
definition.106 Wisconsin trade secret law, therefore, employs the 
definition of “trade secrets” found in § 757 of the Restatement of Torts 
and Wisconsin courts still refer to that restatement’s six factor test to 
determine the presence of a trade secret.107 Notably, in determining the 
threshold for which information is entitled to trade secret protection, 
                                                                                                                   
statutes are largely in agreement with each other and are fair representatives of other 
state trade secrets statutes across the country. 
104 Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 900 (N.D. Ind. 
2002); U.S. Land Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Surveyor, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 49, 63 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
105 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 916 (Ind. 1993) (holding that 
information requiring a substantial investment of time, expense, or effort is not 
readily ascertainable); see also Coleman v. Vukovich, 825 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ind. 
App. Ct. 2005) (customer list was not protectable because it was available to all 
employees, was kept unlocked, and on computers that were not password protected); 
Flotec, Inc. v. Southern Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000-1001 (S.D. Ind. 
1998) (holding that information is not entitled protection where reverse engineering 
is a viable option for discovering an alleged trade secret); Xpert Automation Sys. 
Corp. v. Vibromatic Co., 569 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Ind. App. Ct. 1991) (customer lists 
are not entitled protection if they can be discovered by reasonable means); but see 
Ackerman v. Kimball Intern, 634 N.E.2d 778, 784 n. 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) 
(rejecting the “economically feasible” standard, instead requiring that defendant 
could have replicated the asserted trade secret without “substantial investment of 
time, expense or effort”). 
106 Wisc. Elec. Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisconsin, 329 N.W.2d 
178, 181-82 (Wis. 1983). 
107 Id. Wisconsin law also does not provide trade secret protection for “single 
event” information such as bidding prices. 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                         Volume 3, Issue 2                        Spring 2008 
 
 708
Wisconsin courts have interpreted “readily ascertainable” quite 
differently than their sister courts in Indiana. According to Wisconsin 
law, information is “readily ascertainable” only if it is discoverable 
“with a fair degree of ease, without difficulty.”108 
Illinois, which did not enact its trade secret act until 1988, 
benefitted by waiting for its neighbor states to interpret some of the 
more ambiguous sections of the UTSA.109 In defining trade secrets, the 
Illinois Trade Secrets Act adopted a hybrid between the UTSA and 
Restatement definitions. In Illinois, a trade secret owner must show: 
“(1) that the information is sufficiently secret to derive economic 
value; (2) that the information is not within the realm of general skills 
and knowledge of the relevant industry; and (3) that the information 
cannot be readily duplicated without involving considerable time, 
effort, and expense.”110 Additionally, the six Restatement factors have 
been held applicable in determining whether a trade secret exists.111 
Illinois law, therefore, does not require reasonable efforts to maintain a 
trade secret’s secrecy even though efforts to maintain secrecy might 
factor into whether the information is readily ascertainable as well as 
the secret’s relative value. 
While other states employ subtly different definitions of “trade 
secrets” and may employ slightly different standards in determining 
when a misappropriation has occurred, these three statutes represent a 
fair sampling of how trade secret law has developed in the 46 states 
that have enacted some version of the UTSA. These three statutes also 
exemplify that—regardless of how states have enacted their trade 
                                                 
108 Editions Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Pub. Co., Inc., 1993 WL 541219, at *4 
(S.D. N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993) (referring to Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (1986) to inform its definition of “easily ascertainable”) (applying 
Wisconsin law). 
109 See X-It Prods., LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 
494, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 2002) (construing Illinois law). 
110 Lynchval Sys. Inc. v. Chicago Consulting Actuaries, 1998 WL 151814, at 
*5 (N.D. Ill. March 27, 1998). 
111 Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 727 (7th 
Cir. 2003). The third factor in Illinois’ trade secret definition also indicates that 
Illinois has adopted a standard that information must be more analogous to Indiana’s 
strict “readily ascertainable” standard than to Wisconsin’s relaxed standard. 
19
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secret statutes—there remains an inherent conflict with the federal and 
state freedom of information laws. 
 
III.  THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
 
During the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, a growing public 
appreciation for transparent governance led Congress to enact the 
1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).112 The FOIA mandated that 
federal government records be accessible to the public upon request.113 
According to the FOIA, each agency, upon a reasonably descriptive 
request for records, must make the records promptly available to any 
person.114 Under the FOIA, the identity of a requester is irrelevant.115 
A requester also does not need to demonstrate any specific need or 
reason for his or her request.116 Because the federal FOIA only applies 
to federal executive agencies, and not to records held by state 
governments,117 all 50 states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted their own state FOIAs that are almost unanimously identical to 
the federal act.118 
In the interest of full public disclosure, FOIA statutes make no 
distinction between records created by government agencies and those 
merely collected by government agencies after being submitted by 
private business concerns. Generally, any document in an agency’s 
files is subject to requests made under the FOIA.119 This makes it 
                                                 
112 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
115 See id. 
116 See Nat’l Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 
144 (1975). 
117 St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th 
Cir. 1981) ("agency" under the federal FOIA does not include state agencies). 
118 See Guidebook to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts 89-93 
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1986 & Supp. 2008) for a listing of all state FOIA 
statutes. States within the Seventh Circuit have enacted the following state Freedom 
of Information Acts: 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/1 (West 2008); Ind. Code § 5-14-3-
4 (West 2008); Wis. Stat. § 19.36 (West 2008). 
119 Brian E. Lebowitz, Note, The Freedom of Nonfree Information: An 
Economic Proposal for Government Disclosure of Privately Submitted Commercial 
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highly possible that any information filed with the government will be 
revealed to the public upon request. 
It is hardly surprisingly, therefore, that studies reveal that the vast 
majority of FOIA requests do not come from private citizens or 
institutions.120 Most FOIA requests are made by businesses, either 
directly or through third party intermediaries, to agencies that compile 
data provided to the government by American businesses.121 In this 
way, nearly any information that a business submits to a government 
agency can end up in the hands of a competitor. 
Statistics such as these imply that the Patriot Homes situation 
might not be uncommon at all. Perhaps the only reason that Patriot 
Homes distinguishes itself from “business as usual” is that 
chronologically, the defendant waited until after the preliminary 
injunction hearing to make its FOIA requests. Had Sterling Homes 
simply made its FOIA request first, before using the information taken 
by Patriot’s former employees, it may have been able to claim from 
the onset that the purported trade secrets were readily ascertainable 
and not protected under the Indiana Uniform Trade Secret Act. 
 
A.  Policy and Exemptions 
 
Prior to enacting the federal FOIA, Congress contemplated 
potentially competing interests. FOIA addressed the public's right to 
access governmental records. There was also a competing interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of information submitted to the 
                                                                                                                   
Information, 32 STAN. L. REV. 339, 339 (1980) (agency files generally subject to the 
FOIA include "a vast array of documents submitted by private firms that include 
commercially valuable information"). 
120 W. Casey, Jr., J. Marthinsen, & L. Moss, Entrepreneurship, Productivity, 
and the Freedom of Information Act 11, 47–86 (Lexington Books 1983). 
121 Id. While there are studies reaching the opposite conclusion through studies 
of direct and reverse FOIA litigation, see Mark Q. Connelly, Secrets and 
Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of 
Business Data, 1981 WISC. L. REV. 207, 209–210 (1981), those results are 
questionable in light of the costs of complicated litigation that “might well preclude 
a small business from ever seeking to prevent [FOIA] disclosures.” Nat’l Parks and 
Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 681 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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government. Congress felt that FOIA’s "success lies in providing a 
workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all 
interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.”122 
Therefore, although disclosure of agency records is the act’s foremost 
goal,123 Congress carved out nine exemptions to the FOIA’s mandated 
disclosures.124 
Among those eight exemptions are “(4) trade secrets and 
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and 
privileged or confidential.”125 Courts have recognized several 
justifications for Exemption 4, including protecting the confidentiality 
of information submitted to the government,126 insuring the 
competitive position of parties submitting information,127 and 
encouraging cooperation with the government by those with useful 
information.128 Unfortunately, two issues prevent Exemption 4 from 
fully achieving all of its goals. 
First, parties submitting information to government agencies 
cannot fully control whether that agency will disclose it. The Supreme 
Court held that an agency’s invocation of the FOIA’s exemptions is 
discretionary, not mandatory—allowing agencies to withhold records 
                                                 
122 S. REP. NO. 89-813 at 3 (1965); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497 at 5-7 
(1966). 
123 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). 
124 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). 
125 Id. at § 552(b)(4) (clearly there is no accounting for the 92nd Congress’ 
impeccable grammar). 
126 See Shermco Indus., Inc. v. Sec. of Air Force, 613 F.2d 1314, 1317 (5th Cir. 
1980) (purpose of Exemption 4 is to protect interests of individuals who disclose 
information and to protect the government) 
127 See Nadler v. FDIC, 899 F. Supp. 158, 160-61 (S.D. N.Y. 1995), aff’d 92 
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1996) (Exemption 4 helps ensure the government’s continued 
ability to collect information); 
128 See Burke Energy Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 583 F. Supp. 507, 510-11 (D. 
Kan. 1984) (holding that the purposes of Exemption 4 include avoiding substantial 
competitive harm, protecting privacy, and “facilitate[ing] citizens’ ability to confide 
in their government”). 
22
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but not requiring them to do so.129 Consequentially, the FOIA protects 
a private party’s interest in the confidentiality of information 
submitted to the government “only to the extent that this interest is 
endorsed by the agency collecting the information.”130 
Second, the Freedom of Information Act contains no specific 
definition of “trade secrets” or “confidential” as applicable to 
Exemption 4.131 Prior to FOIA’s enactment, the common law 
definition of trade secrets, based chiefly on the Restatement (First) of 
Torts, had been largely settled.132 Since the FOIA’s passage, however, 
the majority of states have passed their own state trade secret laws 
modeled after the UTSA.133 This alone creates the potential for 
conflict between the laws that states have enacted to protect trade 
secrets and the body of law used to construe trade secrets under he 
FOIA. In addition, at least one circuit created its own narrow 
definition of “trade secret” for the explicit purpose of FOIA 
litigation.134 Thus, while modern trade secrets generally have similar 
definitions and treatment across the states with respect to intellectual 
property litigation, the same cannot be said for FOIA litigation. 
Another obstacle to protecting the secrecy of information 
provided to the government lies in the FOIA’s own provisions. If an 
agency denies a FOIA request, the requestor may sue the government 
agency to challenge the withholding. In such cases, a court may 
examine the contents of any withheld agency records to determine 
                                                 
129 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (holding that 
“Congress did not design the FOIA Exemptions to be mandatory bars to 
disclosure”). 
130 Id. 
131 See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (noting that FOIA does not contain a definition for “confidential” as 
applicable to Exemption 4). While many statutes contain prefatory definitions 
sections, FOIA does not. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
132 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974) 
(adopting the Restatement definition of trade secrets). 
133 See JAGER, supra note 3, § 12.1.  
134 See, e.g., Pub. Citizens Health Research Group v. Food and Drug 
Administration, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the 
Restatement’s definition of trade secrets and construing the term more narrowly than 
its traditional common law definition). 
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whether they fall under any of the FOIA’s exemptions. If they do not, 
the court may enjoin the agency from withholding the records.135 
Importantly, according to the FOIA, the agency bears the burden of 
proving that such records were properly withheld.136 If the agency 
cannot meet its burden, it is liable for the other party’s attorney’s fees 
and litigation costs.137 
Those FOIA provisions effectively create a disincentive for an 
agency to withhold anything but the most clear-cut trade secrets. 
Under the FOIA, refusing to release requested documents—especially 
if a documents’ trade secret status is not manifestly obvious—simply 
is not in an agency’s interest. A party that submits information that it 
considers valuable or confidential therefore can have little expectation 
that such information will remain secret. 
 
B.  Scope of the Trade Secrets Exemption 
 
The legislative history of FOIA’s trade secret exemption, 
Exemption 4, neither reveals its scope nor defines its legal 
terminology.138 In construing its language, courts have generally 
concluded that Exemption 4 recognizes two distinct classes of 
information: (1) trade secrets, and (2) commercial or financial 
information that was obtained by a person and is privileged and 
confidential.139  
                                                 
135 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
136 See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 861 
(D.C.Cir.1980)) (holding that “conclusory assertions will not suffice to carry the 
government’s burden of proof in withholding information requested through the 
FOIA”). 
137 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
138 See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497at 10 (1966); S. REP. NO. 89-813 at 9 (1965). The 
states have similar state FOIA provisions protecting trade secret and confidential 
information. See Coblentz v. City of Novi, 719 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Mich. 2006) 
(discussing the Michigan FOIA statute, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.231 et seq. 
(West 2008)). 
139 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 
F.2d 1280, 1288-90 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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In accordance with the FOIA’s general objective of public 
disclosure, courts tend to narrowly construe the specific subject matter 
covered by Exemption 4.140 The definition of “trade secret” as 
explicitly applied to Exemption 4, therefore, is far more restrictive 
than the definition that developed elsewhere in the common law, either 
Restatement, or the UTSA.141 For the purpose of Exemption 4 of 
FOIA, “trade secret” has been defined as a “secret, commercially 
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, 
preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that 
can be said to be end product of either innovation or substantial 
effort.”142 
In Public Citizen Health and Research Group v. FDA, concerning 
ongoing clinical studies on the safety and efficacy of intraocular 
lenses, the court rejected the Restatement's "overly broad 
construction" of trade secrets with regards to Exemption 4 of the 
FOIA.143 In that case, the D.C. circuit adopted its definition from an 
obscure case from 1925144 that was moot when it was decided,145 and a 
second case that was dismissed as moot on appeal.146 Unlike previous 
                                                 
140 FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982) (noting the “oft-repeated caveat 
that FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed”); see Dep’t of Air Force v. 
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (explaining that “disclosure, not secrecy, is the 
dominant objective of the statute”). 
141 Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288; see also Anderson v. Health & Human 
Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1990). 
142 Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288. 
143 Id. at 1282. 
144 Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. U.S. Tariff Comm’n, 6 F.2d 491 (D.C. 
Cir. 1925), reversed, 274 U.S. 106 (1927) The Norwegian court defined trade secret 
as “an unpatented, secret, commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, or 
process, which is used for the making, preparing, compounding, treating, or 
processing of articles or materials which are trade commodities.” Id. at 495 
(emphasis added). Notably, Norwegian was decided 4 years before the Restatement 
of Torts suggested the trade secret definition that ultimately was adopted in the 
common law and 50 years before Kewanee Oil, in which the Supreme Court 
employed the Restatement definition of trade secrets. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974). 
145 Norwegian, 274 U.S. at 110. 
146 Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 310 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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FOIA Exemption 4 decisions, the Public Citizens test requires a 
“direct relationship between the information at issue and the 
productive process.”147 
One problem with the Public Citizen test is that it essentially 
disqualifies basic research that has not yet been commercialized from 
Exemption 4’s protection because basic research is not “commercial” 
and may not yet lend itself to the productive process.148 With Public 
Citizen, what began as “a precedential aberration in trade secret 
law”149 has now been adopted by many circuits that have addressed 
the issue.150 The Public Citizen standard also precludes a great deal of 
subject matter protectable as trade secrets under the common law but 
not specifically “used for the making, preparing, compounding, or 
processing of trade commodities.”151 
For matters other than trade secrets, such as commercial, 
technical, and financial data, courts have developed a two-part test to 
determine whether withholding information under the FOIA’s 
Exception 4 is proper.152 The Circuits have unanimously interpreted 
that information is “confidential” commercial or financial information 
under Exemption 4, and thus exempt from disclosure under the 
                                                 
147 Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288. 
148 See e.g. Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
627 F.2d 392, 403 n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1983) abrogated on other grounds by U.S. Dep’t 
of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982). 
149 See James T. O’Reilly, Trade Secrets: Asleep at the Switch? 12 AIPLA Q.J. 
13, 26 n.29 (1984). 
150 See Anderson v. Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (10th Cir. 
1990); see also Harrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326 (D. Wyo. 2000) 
(invoking Public Citizens’ definition of trade secrets although the court still upheld 
the FAA’s decision to withhold information); Teich v. Food & Drug Admin., 751 F. 
Supp. 243, 254 n.8 (D. D.C. 1990) (upholding the FDA’s decision to disclose data 
involving animal studies by a manufacturer of silicone breast implants that had only 
a “tangential relationship to the productive process”); Burnside-Ott Aviation 
Training Ctr., Inc. v. U.S., 617 F. Supp. 279, 285-86 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (adopting the 
Public Citizens definition). 
151 Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
152 Nat’l Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 677-79 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976). 
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Freedom of Information Act, if its disclosure would likely (1) impair 
the government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future, 
or (2) cause substantial competitive harm to the party from whom the 
information was obtained.153 
Generally, for “confidential and privileged information” an 
important consideration is whether submitters are statutorily required 
to provide information to the government. If a statute requires 
submitting information, there will be a presumption that public 
disclosure of that information will not impair Exemption 4’s 
justification.154 The same is true for information submitted to 
governmental agencies for the purposes of obtaining government 
contacts or obtaining permits.155 Conversely, when information is 
volunteered, the government has a stronger interest in ensuring its 





                                                 
153 Id. at 679; accord Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 
141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Contact Freighters, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
260 F.3d 858, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2001); Nadler v. F.D.I.C., 92 F.3d 93, 95-96 (2d Cir. 
1996); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 
1994); Acumenics Research & Tech. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 843 F.2d 800, 807 (4th 
Cir. 1988); Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Block, 755 F.2d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 
1985); Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1398 
(7th Cir. 1984); 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1983). 
154 See, e.g., Gersh & Danielson v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 871 F. Supp. 407, 
410 (D.Colo. 1994) (holding that because studies submitted to EPA during 
investigation into Clean Water Act violations were not “voluntarily submitted,” no 
FOIA exemptions were applicable). 
155 See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (noting that the government’s ability to obtain information would not be 
impaired because submission of financial statements was a mandatory requirement 
of operating concessions in national parks). 
156 See id.; see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that information 
voluntarily provided by industry group to regulatory commission was “confidential” 
and exempt from FOIA disclosure). 
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C.  State FOIA Trade Secret Exemptions 
 
State FOIA trade secret exemptions are very similar in scope 
across all three states within the Seventh Circuit and are indicative of 
the type of state FOIA trade secret exemptions found elsewhere across 
the country. Indeed, the state FOIA trade secret exemptions mirror the 
language and rationale behind the federal FOIA trade secret 
exemptions.157 State courts, however, tend to defer to the judgment of 
protectionist state agencies more often than their federal counterparts. 
For example, the Illinois FOIA trade secret exemption applies to 
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 
a person or business where the trade secrets or information are 
proprietary, privileged, or confidential, or where disclosure of the trade 
secrets or information may cause competitive harm.”158 Like the two-
pronged test that courts have adopted for the federal FOIA trade secret 
exemption, Illinois’ trade secret definition encompasses information 
that “(1) would either inflict substantial competitive harm, or (2) make 
it more difficult for the agency to induce people to submit similar 
information in the future.”159 Unlike the federal FOIA exemption, 
however, the Illinois legislature intended that “trade secret” in the 
Illinois FOIA disclosure exemption be construed broadly in order to 
encourage private parties to do business with the state.160 
Illinois courts have also qualified the “competitive harm” that the 
trade secret exemption was designed to prevent.161 The burden is still 
on the state agency to demonstrate both that “the person or entity from 
which information was obtained actually faces competition . . . and 
                                                 
157 See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/7(1)(g) (West 2008) (Illinois Freedom 
of Information Act). 
158 Id.; see Roulette v. Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs., 490 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1986). 
159 BlueStar Energy Servs., Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 871 N.E.2d 
880, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
160 Id.; Roulette, 490 N.E.2d at 64 (extending trade secret exemption to 
psychologist’s written evaluation of applicant for police officer’s personality test and 
interview). 
161 Cooper v. Dep’t of the Lottery, 640 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) 
(quoting Calhoun v. Lyng, 864 F.2d 34, 36 (5th Cir. 1988)).  
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substantial harm to a competitive position would likely result from 
disclosure of the information.”162 
Like courts in Illinois, Indiana courts have also interpreted the 
state’s FOIA trade secret exemptions broadly.163 Unlike the more 
restrictive definition attributed by courts to trade secrets under the 
federal FOIA regime, the Indiana legislature specifically adopted the 
same definition for trade secrets with regard to the FOIA exemption 
that it did with regard to the IUTSA.164 Similarly, Wisconsin also 
applies the same definition to trade secrets with regards to its FOIA 
exemption as in its trade secret law, which mirrors the UTSA 
language.165 
The breadth with which these three states apply their FOIA trade 
secret exemptions signify that the states have recognized the value in 
protecting their industries’ valuable proprietary information. Patriot 
Homes was unable to prevent state agencies from releasing their 
purported trade secret information, possibly because it failed to mark 
its agency submissions as confidential. Had Patriot made a more 
concerted effort to ensure the confidentiality of its records, however, 
these statutes and interpretations indicate a potential willingness on the 
part of state agencies to more proactively protect privately submitted 
records than is found under the federal FOIA exemption. 
                                                 
162 Id. In Cooper, the court held that the Illinois lottery is a legal monopoly. Id. 
The court then reasoned that because the lottery does not face any competition, 
disclosing a marketing report would not be harmful to the outside firm that prepared 
it. Id. 
163 Robinson v. Indiana Univ., 659 N.E.2d 153, 156-7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) 
(extending trade secret exemption to cover experimental scientific research). The 
court also noted how Indiana’s broad treatment of its state FOIA trade secret 
exemption differs from North Carolina’s treatment of the same issue. See id.; contra 
S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, Inc. v. Huffines, 399 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. App. 1991). 
164 Ind. Code § 5-14-3-4(a)(4) (West 2008) (Indiana disclosure exemptions). In 
addition, the Indiana Administrative Code instructs state agencies to refer to the 
Indiana Trade Secret Act, Ind. Code § 24-2-3-2 (West 2008), in defining trade 
secrets for FOIA request purposes. See 17 Ind. Admin. Code Ann. 1-2-9 (West 
2008). 
165 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.36(5) (West 2008), referring to Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
134.90(1)(c), the definitions section of Wisconsin’s Trade Secret Act, for the 
definition of trade secrets under the state FOIA exemption. 
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D.  Private Actions to Enjoin Agency Disclosure 
 
Individuals and companies have attempted to protect their trade 
secrets by affirmatively seeking to enjoin agency disclosure. These so-
called “reverse-FOIA” suits, however, have been met with extremely 
limited success. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,166 the Supreme Court 
essentially foreclosed most grounds under which private parties might 
seek to enjoin agency disclosure of trade secrets. “The FOIA is 
exclusively a disclosure statute and affords Chrysler no private right of 
action to enjoin agency disclosure.”167 
Before the Chrysler decision, the circuits were split on whether 
the FOIA exemptions were mandatory or permissive.168 Since 
Chrysler, however, courts have overwhelmingly adopted the Supreme 
Court’s rule that the FOIA favors disclosure.169 Furthermore, even 
agencies that apply the FOIA exemptions prior to deciding whether to 
disclose are free to decide the extent to which they apply.170 
The Chrysler decision did not leave parties attempting to prevent 
government agencies from disclosing submitted information entirely 
without recourse. Jurisdiction for reverse-FOIA lawsuits are rarely 
denied171 because the Supreme Court allowed for a remedy under the 
                                                 
166 441 U.S. 281 (1979). 
167 Id. at 282 (emphasis added). 
168 See Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding 
that the exemptions were mandatory was later withdrawn as premature); 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1199 (4th Cir. 1976) 
(holding that some of the FOIA exemption are mandatory); but see Pennzoil Co. v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 534 F.2d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the FOIA 
exemptions are permissive). 
169 See FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 598 F.2d 790, 800 
(3d Cir. 1979); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 615 F.2d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). 
170 See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 598 F.2d at 800 (the agency may establish more 
liberal disclosure policies than the FOIA requires). 
171 See Carolyn B. Kuhl, Note, Protection From Government Disclosure—The 
Reverse-FOIA Suit, 2 DUKE L.J. 330 (1976). 
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Administrative Procedures Act (APA)172 if a submitter can claim to be 
a “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved” by agency action.173 
The standard APA review in reverse-FOIA cases involves an 
examination of the agency’s record regarding its decision-making 
process.174 While some courts have allowed for de novo review of 
agency determinations to disclose information,175 the standard reverse-
FOIA standard of review is whether the administrative record shows 
an agency’s decision to disclose the information at issue to be arbitrary 
or capricious.176 That standard places a heavy burden on the plaintiff-
submitter who brings a reverse-FOIA lawsuit.177 
While a review of an agency’s record regarding its decision does 
allow parties attempting to foreclose government disclosure of trade 
secrets or private information, it does not allow submitting parties to 
play any role in making that decision in the first place. Reverse-FOIA 
litigation, therefore, is limited in that it only allows parties to review 
decisions that have already been made. Even where litigants are able 
to review the agency decisions de novo, reverse-FOIA lawsuits are 
steeply uphill battles. Better alternatives would be to allow parties who 
submit proprietary information to government agencies to make their 
case against disclosure from the beginning. One possibility might be to 
                                                 
172 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000). 
173 Id. at § 702. 
174 U.S. v. Geophysical Corp. of Alaska, 732 F.2d 693, 701 (9th Cir. 1984); see 
also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303, 304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(tracing the proper procedure for precluding agency disclosure under the FOIA). 
175 Anderson v. Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(remanding case for lower court review on a document by document basis); 
Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 668 F.2d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
176 CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(evaluating submitter’s claims of confidentiality under the abuse of discretion 
standard); Union Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 
1976) (evaluating regulations guiding agency determinations of whether information 
should be excluded from FOIA disclosures under a “substantial evidence” standard 
of review). 
177 See Pacific Architects & Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 906 F.2d 1345, 
1347-48 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that there will be a strong presumption that the 
administrative agency has proceeded with adequate fact-finding procedures and that 
the administrative decision favoring disclosure is not reviewable de novo). 
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allow the submitters’ interests to temper the agencies’ initial decisions. 
Another might be to allow parties attempting to prevent disclosure to 
assume the governmental agencies’ burden of “fighting” rejected 
disclosure requests. 
 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Patriot Homes exemplifies the need for a cohesive method of 
managing the inherent inconsistencies between FOIA statutes and 
trade secret law. Aside from the numerous industries that are closely 
regulated by state and federal agencies, there has also been a recent 
trend towards heightened disclosure of corporate financial information 
and more precise corporate valuations of intellectual property 
assets.178 Whereas disclosing corporate financial records for 
government oversight and scrutiny certainly serves an important 
public purpose, part and parcel with increased disclosure comes an 
increased risk that contributing parties will lose control of their 
valuable confidential information.179 
With great power comes great responsibility.180 An agency that 
receives vast amounts of trade secrets and confidential financial 
information must ensure that such information can be protected. While 
the public’s interest in its ability to request agency records is 
unquestionable, there currently is no appropriate mechanism to ensure 
that confidential information remains confidential.181 Patriot Homes is 
somewhat unique in that a FOIA request occurred well after the 
alleged trade secret misappropriation. It is not unique, however, in the 
respect that it involves one company successfully mining government 
agencies for its competitor’s valuable confidential information.182  
                                                 
178 See Wilson, supra note 48, at 265-66. 
179 See id. 
180 Stan Lee, Spiderman (advice given from Uncle Ben to Peter Parker). 
181 See generally, Wilson, supra note 48. Wilson ultimately contends that in 
light of various reporting statutes and the difficulties in protecting a company’s trade 
secrets, good corporate management and conscientious business practices give 
companies the best chances of preserving its trade secrets. Id. at 291. 
182 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 10.1 n.12 (3d 
ed. 2000) (contending that prior to the rise of the internet, “perhaps 85% of the 
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A.  Likely Outcome of Patriot Homes 
 
Based on the district court’s ruling on Sterling’s summary 
judgment motion, Sterling Homes is not likely to succeed in its 
defense that Patriot’s asserted trade secret claims were essentially 
preempted by their disclosure by state regulatory agencies. As the 
Northern District of Indiana already held, there are a number of 
reasons that Sterling’s FOIA-disclosure defense will ultimately fail.183 
First, Sterling admitted that while nearly all of Patriot’s trade 
secret information was available through state FOIA requests, not all 
of the information was available in the public domain.184 Summary 
judgment should only be granted where all of the asserted trade secrets 
are readily ascertainable by other means.185 
Additionally, courts have regularly held that where a defendant’s 
product was actually developed using the plaintiff’s proprietary 
information, there is no cognizable defense that the product could have 
been developed independently.186 Just because Sterling was able to 
obtain the vast majority of the same information from state agencies 
does not change the fact that it used Patriot’s designs. 
Furthermore, and importantly, the aggregate of information that 
Sterling received from the state agencies was all in paper form.187 The 
information that Sterling’s employees took from Patriot was in 
electronic form.188 This shows that Patriot’s information was not 
readily available to Sterling in the same format, and presumably there 
is independent economic value in the electronic files not present in the 
                                                                                                                   
FDA’s 30,000 annual FOI requests . . . had come from businesses seeking other 
firms’ reports.”). 
183 Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., No. 3:05 CV 471 AS, 2007 
WL 2782272 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2007) (rejecting defendant’s motion for partial 
summary judgment on misappropriation of trade secrets). 
184 Id. at *2. 
185 See id. at *2-3. 
186 U.S. Land Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Surveyor, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 49, 64 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
187 Patriot Homes, 2007 WL 2782272 at *3. 
188 Id. 
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voluminous paper files.189 The electronic files are far more efficiently 
adapted than are the paper files, which would require considerable 
time and effort to convert to usable engineering schematics.190 
Finally, the court insinuated that perhaps within the context of 
trade secret law, information only available through the plaintiff 
company itself or a state agency that collected the information might 
not really be “readily available.”191 While not dispositive, in 
combination with the other arguments, this “equitable” reasoning 
seems to embody the spirit of both trade secret law and FOIA’s lofty 
goals. 
This result reflects an accurate interpretation of trade secret law 
but does not necessarily answer some of the underlying legal conflicts 
that this case brings to light. 
 
B. Equitable Proposal 
 
It would seem entirely antithetical to the needs of modern 
businesses and the government if valuable trade secrets and 
confidential information regularly escaped their owners’ control. This, 
however, is exactly what can currently happen because FOIA punishes 
agencies for withholding information and a gives private entity nearly 
no recourse in trying to maintain its secrets. Because agencies 
currently bear the burden and costs of maintaining industry’s secrets, it 
is simply cheaper and less onerous to disclose “close calls” than to 
deny a FOIA request and risk litigation.192 
                                                 
189 See Northern Elec. Co., Inc. v. Torma, 819 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005) (electronic compilation of motor servicing information was held not to be 
readily ascertainable even though all the information was publicly available in paper 
form). 
190 Id.; Patriot Homes, 2007 WL 2782272 at *3. 
191 Patriot Homes, 2007 WL 2782272, at *3; see Taco Cabana Intern., Inc. v. 
Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1124 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
192 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & 
PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 431, 436 (Sept. 1998) (directing government agencies to 
favor disclosure over withholding information unless the agency could anticipate 
foreseeable harm in disclosure). 
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Conversely, many parties contributing proprietary and 
confidential information to government agencies would likely seize 
the opportunity to take on the agencies’ burden and “fight” FOIA 
disclosure requests themselves. The flurry of reverse-FOIA 
litigation—where a private party sues an agency to prevent the agency 
from complying with a FOIA request—is evidence of that pervasive 
willingness.193 
A solution presents itself that would encompass FOIA’s policy of 
maximized disclosure while accounting for a submitting parties’ 
interest in maintaining the secrecy of their confidential information. 
Submitters should have the option of self-policing the disclosure of 
their own confidential information. This would mean that a party 
compelled to disclose confidential records to a government agency 
could essentially opt to supplant the government agency in “fighting” 
to uphold a FOIA rejection.194 Under this scheme, private entities 
would be responsible for litigating the agency’s position when it 
denies a FOIA request. 
Individuals or businesses that contribute information to 
government agencies should be able to denote the specific pieces of 
information that they consider to be trade secrets. Trade secret owners 
could also provide additional documentation to help prove to agency 
personnel that the claimed trade secrets should remain protected under 
FOIA’s trade secret exemption. The agency personnel in charge of 
fulfilling FOIA requests will then be able to make more informed 
decisions regarding whether to disclose the information if requested 
through FOIA.195 If an agency agrees with the trade secret owner, and 
invokes FOIA’s trade secret exemption, then the burden will remain 
with the agency to defend its decision should the requesting party sue 
                                                 
193 See Kuhl, supra note 171. 
194 If an agency decides to withhold information requested through FOIA, it 
currently bears the burden of defending its decision should the requesting party sue 
to compel the agency for disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
195 Currently, businesses can attempt to identify trade secret information when 
submitting bids for government contracts, though they generally do not have the 
opportunity to provide additional documentation to back up their designations. See 
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 12.02 (2003). 
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for disclosure. On the other hand, if the agency disagrees with the 
purported trade secret owner and declines to invoke FOIA’s trade 
secret exemption on its own, then the information’s owner could 
intervene. The agency will then withhold the purported trade secret so 
long as the information’s owner agrees to accept the costs and legal 
burden if the requesting party sues for disclosure. 
The benefit of this scheme will be twofold. First, it will allow 
purported trade secret owner more latitude in controlling the secrecy 
of its valuable information. Individuals can determine exactly which 
pieces of information they consider to be trade secrets and precisely 
the lengths they will undergo and costs they will incur to protect that 
information. By marking trade secret information before submitting it 
to government agencies, and providing any additional necessary 
documentation, individuals could help better inform agency decisions 
regarding whether the agency should invoke FOIA’s trade secret 
exemption. This plan will then allow individuals to shoulder the 
litigation-related burdens of withholding information from FOIA 
requests if they still want to protect their information after an agency 
declines to invoke a FOIA exemption.196 That will force an individual 
or business to determine precisely the lengths they are willing to go to 
protect their information, both financially and strategically. 
This scheme will also benefit the government agencies by 
relieving them of the burden of fighting FOIA-related litigation in 
three ways. It will eliminate the need to defend some of an agency’s 
decisions to withhold information because the burden will shift to the 
information’s owner. Additionally, where an agency does have to 
legally defend its decision to withhold information under FOIA’s trade 
secret exemption, it will oftentimes have documentation from the trade 
secret’s owner available as evidence to support the agency’s judgment. 
This new scheme will also all but eliminate reverse-FOIA litigation, 
which will free up any resources that an agency otherwise would have 
                                                 
196 If an agency determined that information did not fall under FOIA’s trade 
secret exemption after reviewing documentation that attempted to justify its status as 
a trade secret, it would obviously help indicate to the information’s owner the trade 
secret’s probable protectability. This, in turn, would inform the individual or 
business’ decision of whether to accept the burden of protecting the information. 
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to devote to fighting lawsuits brought by parties attempting to protect 
submitted information. 
Every state and the federal government has its own FOIA law.197 
Therefore, any new law that attempted to remedy the trade secret 
disclosure problem would need to either be enacted by each state 
individually or by Congress through its commerce power.198 A federal 
law, enacted through the Commerce Clause,199 would be applicable to 
all states and would systematically solve FOIA’s problem. Congress 
could also simply amend the federal FOIA statute and wait for the 
states to follow suit. The problem with this route is that, like Patriot 
Homes, many businesses operate in multiple states and must submit 
proprietary information to agencies in each state.200 Changes in one 
state’s FOIA statute would not help a business protect its trade secrets 
if the same changes were not also made in the other states.201 
As previously noted, anyone can make a FOIA request for any 
reason. This scheme does run the risk of abuse by large companies 
protecting too much information, regardless of the cost, to the public’s 
detriment. It also runs the risk of wealthy companies attempting to 
bankrupt their smaller competitors through “frivolous” FOIA-related 
litigation.202 These risks, while real, do not detract from the overall 
efficacy of this new scheme. First, companies will not want to abuse 
the new system for fear of reverting to the current system. Second, 
companies currently cannot affirmatively protect any information from 
competitors’ FOIA requests. Allowing them to pick and choose which 
                                                 
197 See Guidebook to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts 89-93 
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1986 & Supp. 2008). 
198 “The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 8 (commonly referred to as the “Commerce Clause”). 
199 Id. 
200 Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
201 The defendant in Patriot Homes, for example, made FOIA requests in 
Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, even though it was only sued in Indiana. Id. 
202 A potential problem might arise where a smaller company attempts to 
protect information that a government agency is unwilling to protect and a larger 
competitor sues for disclosure simply to create an expense for its smaller competitor. 
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information is worth protecting will allow companies to avoid costly, 
“frivolous” litigation if they do not feel the trade secret is worth the 
high costs of protection. 
Reverse-FOIA litigation can be exceedingly complex and 
expensive. So can losing one’s valuable trade secrets to a competitor. 
Both needless costs are not just possible, but likely, under current 
FOIA statutes. While this one solution certainly is not exhaustive for 
such a complex issue, it is a good start. Taking account for the 
competing interests and economic realities pertaining to the value of 
confidential information and trade secrets, allowing for a secret’s 
owner to bear the burden of protecting it seems to be a fair 
compromise. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Trade secrets are notoriously difficult to maintain, enforce, and 
protect. Though they are property, unlike other forms of intellectual 
property, once misappropriated—disclosed to, or used by a 
competitor—they are nearly impossible to recover. Injunctions, like 
the one at the heart of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Patriot Homes, 
are limited in their effectiveness because they can only apply to 
limited parties and not society at large. If a trade secret were posted on 
the internet, for example, no injunction could realistically put the 
proverbial cat back in the bag. 
FOIA is a statute focused on government transparency.203 Judicial 
interpretations have focused on FOIA’s disclosure mandate and have 
limited the breadth of FOIA disclosure exemptions, including the trade 
secret exemption.204 This poses a great risk for trade secret owners 
because any proprietary information whose value or business 
advantage derives from its secrecy may lose that value when disclosed 
to the public through FOIA requests. Currently, individuals or 
businesses seeking to prevent disclosure of their secrets must either 
rely on government agencies to invoke FOIA’s trade secret exemption 
                                                 
203 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973). 
204 FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982) (noting the “oft-repeated caveat 
that FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed”) 
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or attempt the uphill battle of bringing a reserve-FOIA lawsuit to 
enjoin agency disclosure. Neither option provides sufficient assurances 
that trade secrets disclosed to government agencies can remain secret. 
In fact, Patriot Homes highlights the precise risk that companies 
face when they must disclose their proprietary information to 
government regulatory agencies. Patriot Homes does not represent the 
norm though because, chronologically, Sterling did not acquire 
Patriot’s trade secrets through FOIA requests until after Patriot sued 
for trade secret misappropriation.205 Because of this, Patriot actually 
found itself in a better position than do most companies in similar 
situations. It had a legal recourse to recover for the loss of its trade 
secrets.206 
When a company’s competitor attempts to acquire its confidential 
information through FOIA requests, there currently are no adequate 
means to prevent the disclosure. Companies and individuals should be 
afforded the opportunity to help inform government agency decisions 
concerning whether certain information should be withheld from FOIA 
requests as trade secrets. They should also be afforded the opportunity 
to affirmatively attempt to protect information they consider to be 
trade secrets if a government agency is unwilling to invoke the FOIA 
trade secret disclosure exemption. Amending FOIA statutes to allow 
individuals and companies better opportunities to protect their secret 
information will help remedy this situation—benefitting individuals, 
companies, government agencies, and the public. 
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